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ABSTRACT.  Military  and  strategic  perceptions of  the  North  have  changed  several  times  during  the  20th century.  Initially,  the  North  was  simply 
ignored;  later-  by  the  mid-1930s - it  was  perceived  as  a  strategic  barrier  more  formidable  than  either  the  Atlantic or Pacific  oceans.  During  the  Second 
World  War  and  the  Cold War, with  the  views  of  the  United States in  the  dominance,  the  area  was  seen  as  an  approach,  initially  to  Europe  and  Asia,  and 
later  to  the  heartland  of  North  America.  In  contemporary  Canada,  the  North  is  seen  as  having  intrinsic  value  and  as  such  is  deserving  to  be  watched  over, 
protected  and, if necessary,  defended. 
Military  forces  have  been  involved  periodically  in  the  North  since  the  days of  the  Klondike  Gold  Rush  in 1898.  The  intensity  and  degree of this 
involvement  has  reflected  the  changing  perceptions  of  the  North.  Military  presence  can  be  analyzed  as  relating  to  defence,  protection  of  sovereignty  and 
national  development,  although  naturally  many  specific  programs  have  overlapped.  American  involvement,  starting  with  the  United  States’  entry  into 
World War I1 and  continuing  into  the  present,  has  been  extensive  but  primarily  concerned  with  defence. 
Military  activity  has  been  a  significant  factor  in  the  development of  northern  infrastructure  both  as  deliberate  national  development  programs  and  as 
the  by-product  of  defence-related  construction  activities.  While  the  military  has had a  considerable  impact  on  the  North,  the  northern  fact  has  had 
surprisingly  little  impact  upon  the  Canadian  military.  The  Canadian  Forces  are  just  beginning  to  comprehend  the  unique  aspects of  the North  and  to 
develop  policies  and  programs  appropriate  to  contemporary  northern  realities  and  the  assigned  military  responsibility  to  be Cusfos Borealis - Keeper 
of  the  North. 
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RESUME.  Notre  conception  du  Nord  du  point  de  vue  militaire et s rattgique  a  souvent  changke au cours  du  vingtibme  sibcle.  Au dtbut du  sibcle,  le  Nord 
n’avait  gubre  d’importance  sur  le  plan  militaire; plus tad- vers  le  milieu  des annCs trente- on y  voyait  une  banibre  stratkgique  plus  difficile A franchir 
que  les  deux octans. A  I’kpoque de  la  Deuxibme  Guerre  Mondiale,  les  Amtricains  voyaient  le  Nord  comme un  pont B travers  lequel on pourrait  atteindre 
]’Europe  et  1’Asie.  Mais  plus tad,  lors  de  la  guerre  froide,  on  craignait  que  les  Russes  n’attinssent  par ce meme  chemin  le coeur de 1’Amtrique. 
Actuellement,  au  Canada,  nous affiions que  le Nord a  sa  valeur  intrinsbque,  et  qu’il  doit  &tre  surveillk,  protkgt  si  nkcessaire. 
Les forces  militaires  s’engagent  de  temps  en  temps au  Nord depuis  l’tpoque  de la  rude  vers  I’or  du  Klondike en  1898.  L’tvolution  qu’a  subi  notre 
conception  du  Nord  trouve  son dflet dans  l’intensitk  et  le dtgd de  cet  engagement. La pdsence militaire  peut  s’analyser  en  raison  de  la  dkfense,  de  la 
protection  de notre souverainet6 et du  dkveloppement  national,  bien  que,  naturellement,  beaucoup  de  programmes  individuels  se  chevauchent. Le rale 
des  Etats-Unis  au  Nord, dtbutant  lors  de  la Deuxibme  Guerre  Mondiale  pour  continuer  jusqu’au present,  fut  important  surtout  en  ce  qui  concerne  la 
defense. 
L’engagement  militaire  dans  le  Nord  canadien  a  beaucoup  contribuk  au  dtveloppement  de  cette dgion, par  des  programmes  de  dkveloppement 
national,  ainsi  que  par  ses  activitks  de  construction  ne  visant  pas  ntcessairement  le  dkveloppement dgional. Tandis  que  le  militaire  a  beaucoup  apportt 
au dtveloppement du  Nord,  le  Nord  n’a eu  que t&s peu d’effet  sur  les  activitts du  militaire. Les Forces  canadiennes  ne  font  que  commencer B comprendre 
que  le  Nord  prksente  des  aspects  uniques  qui  mkritent  le  dkveloppement  de  politiques  et  programmes  appropriks,  et  que  le  militaire  doit  se  charger  des 
responsabilitks  du Custos Borealis - le  Gardien du  Nord. 
Mots  clks:  L’Arctique,  Canada, dtfense, dtveloppement,  le  Nord,  stratkgie,  souverainett 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “North” to Canadians is more of an idea than a place. 
Starting  in  pre-Confederation days and  extending  in  an  unbro- 
ken  thread to today, the  concept of North  relates to those  lands 
and seas beyond  the frontier, beyond  the  national  transportation 
grid. If one can drive or take a ship or a  train to a  place  twelve 
months  a year, then  it’s  not  North. 
There is  a  tendency  on  the  part of  many  North  Americans, 
including members of the defence establishment, to equate 
North to cold  and snow. While  winter is certainly  the  longest  and 
most  dominant of the  northern seasons, spring  and fall in  the 
form of break-up and freeze-up also occur, as does a brief 
summer.  North does not  mean  winter - it means  isolation. 
This notion  is  worth restating, for it is  fundamental to 
understanding  the  military  in  the  North (Eyre, 1981): the most 
significant  military  characteristic of the Canadian  North  is not 
the climate:  it  is  isolation! 
This  paper  will  focus  on  military  activity  in the North over the 
last 40 years, in  keeping  with  the  theme of this  issue of Arctic. In 
order  to  put  these  years  in perspective, however, it is  necessary 
to  take  a  brief  overview of the total  historical  involvement of the 
military  in the area. 
BEGINNINGS 
The Canadian  North  has  seen  war  only  once  in  the  period f 
recorded history, when during the late 17th and early 18th 
centuries, France  and  Britain  struggled for mastery of a conti- 
nent  and  the  conflict  occasionally  spilled over into  the  settle- 
ments clinging precariously to the shores of  Hudson  Bay.  Fort 
Prince of Wales, north of Churchill, sits remote  and  abandoned 
today, a  mute  testimony to those  bygone  years. 
Military  men  penetrated into the North  in  the  19th century, 
not as warriors, but as explorers. They explored the upper 
reaches of the  boreal forest and  the  barrens  of  Keewatin. The 
search for the Northwest Passage and the quest for the Pole 
intrigued  Victorian era British  and  Americans. A by-product of 
the  search for the lost Franklin  expedition  was  the  preliminary 
mapping  and  charting of the  High North.  The gazetteer of the 
Arctic Archipelago reads like the nominal role of the mid- 
Victorian  Royal  Navy. For the  military  men  of Canada, how- 
ever, the  North  remained terra  incognita until  the  turn of the 
century. 
In 1870, Canada expanded from sea to sea when British 
Columbia joined the  Confederation  and  the  Hudson  Bay  Com- 
pany  tracts  were  added  to  the  new dominion.  Ten years later, the 
islands of the High  Arctic  were  transferred to Canada by Great 
Britain. Canada had  a literal embarrassment of territorial riches. 
As Prime  Minister  Mackenzie  King  was to say  almost  a  century 
later, “Some countries  have too much  history;  Canada  has  too 
much geography.” 
From  the  dawn  of nationhood, the  North  has  been “the land 
of tomorrow” - a  region to be developed, if  not today, then  at 
some time in the future. There has never been a northern 
imperative  in Canada. 
At the start of  the  20th century, no  Canadian  soldier  had ever 
been into the North. Neither had any Canadian sailor, for 
Canada, with the longest coastline of any  nation  on earth, had  no 
navy.  Unlike  many other nations, Canada had not elected to 
station soldiers, on its frontiers and  beyond  but  had  raised  the 
Mounted Police to fulfil  that role. The dozens of “fort” place 
names that dot the Canadian North started not as military 
garrisons  but as fur trading posts. Canada’s  miniscule  regular 
army  and  small  reserve force - the  militia - thought exclu- 
sively  in  terms  of  imperial defence and  the  perceived  American 
threat. The  North, when it was  thought of at all, was  seen as a 
barrier  more formidable than  the  Atlantic or the  Pacific  Oceans. 
The next half century saw sporadic involvement of the 
military  in the North.  Three themes  emerged  that  continue  into 
the present: defence, protection of sovereignty and national 
development.  In  the later stages, a  new  factor - the  strategic 
needs of the  United States - arose, with  major  implications to 
all of the above concepts. The analytic model employed in 
this  paper  uses  these three themes  contrasted  against  the  often 
differing strategic perceptions of Canada  and  the  United States. 
Canadian soldiers f i t  came into the North  at  the  turn of  the 
century when, as a quasi-police auxiliary, the Yukon Field 
Force deployed to Fort Selkirk and Dawson City during the 
Klondike  gold rush. Inasmuch as their  purpose  was  to ensure, if 
necessary, the rule of Canadian law, this was  a clear exercise in 
the  protection of sovereignty role that  was to become so impor- 
tant  three-quarters of a century later. Within  a  few years, the 
Yukon  Field  Force  was gone, its presence as ephemeral as the 
event that  caused its creation in  the  first place. In  a way, this  has 
become the classic pattern of military  involvement  in  the  North 
- activity  has  been  sporadic  and  keyed to a  particular  set of 
circumstances. 
After the departure of the Yukon Field Force, no soldiers 
appeared  in the North  until 1923, when  communicators of  the 
~~~ ~ 
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Royal Canadian Corps of Signals opened the first stations of the 
Northwest Territories and  Yukon Radio System. The event is of 
interest for it marks the first occasion when a Canadian govern- 
ment turned to the military to support national development 
activities in the North. The radio system remained in operation 
throughout  World War 11, expanding and contracting in response 
to commercial and industrial development in the  Yukon  and the 
Mackenzie  Valley and the needs of American-sponsored defence 
projects. 
The Royal Canadian Air Force also came into the North in the 
interwar years as an agent of national development. In 1927 six 
aircraft were deployed into the Hudson Strait area to conduct an 
aerial  survey  in support of plans to open Churchill as  an  ocean 
shipping port. Throughout the 1930s the RCAF undertook 
sporadic “civil government air operations” into the North 
reaching the top of the continent, but never  venturing out over 
the  Arctic Archipelago. 
The Royal Canadian Navy  ignored the North. 
In the early months after the entry of the United States into 
World  War 11, threats to the integrity of the continental United 
States were seen everywhere: from the Japanese via  Alaska  to 
the industrial heartland of the country via submarine-launched 
aircraft flying out of the lower reaches of Hudson Bay! A world 
power girding itself for war is an awesome thing. The Alaska 
Highway and the Northwest Staging Route were almost off- 
handedly  thrown across the Mackenzie Valley  and the Yukon. 
The Canol Pipeline was  laid from the oil fields at Norman Wells 
to a refinery built  in Whitehorse. Later, the Crimson  Route  saw 
a chain of airbases being built to provide an air bridge via the 
northeast to Europe. The Canadian North was used as an 
approach during World  War I1 not by the Axis powers, as  was 
initially feared, but by the United States projecting  its  power  in 
the global conflict (see Dziuban, 1959; Stacey, 1970). 
Since the end of World  War 11, there have  been three surges of 
military interest in the North  that  have  involved  both  Canada 
and the United States. The American interest has  been  almost 
exclusively driven by perceptions of a transpolar strategic threat 
posed  by the Soviet Union.  American-sponsored defence pro- 
jects in the Canadian North have  waxed  and  waned  in  harmony 
with changes in military technology in the nuclear age. It is 
virtually impossible to separate strategic threats to the United 
States from strategic threats to Canada. The two are inextricably 
interwoven - a fact recognized by the multiplicity of joint 
defence arrangements between the two countries. 
For Canada, however, the issue is more complicated. The 
disparate military strengths of the two nations inevitably raises 
issues  of Canadian sovereignty, which  are acute in the North. 
Canada’s armed forces have been  required  not only to defend 
the country from its enemies, but in some strange way, to 
protect  its sovereignty from its friends. 
THE  FIRST  SURGE 
Northern  Approaches, 1947-64 
Both Canada and the United States “discovered” the polar 
projection  map in the immediate postwar years. As the super- 
powers  and their allies drifted into cold war, the importance of 
the  northern approach to North America came to the fore with a 
vengeance. The ghastly one aircraft, one bomb, one city algebra 
of the nuclear age made it inevitable. No longer was the North a 
strategic barrier. It is significant that neither the United States 
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nor Canada looked on the North as a place to be protected 
because of some intrinsic value. Rather it was seen as a 
direction, as an exposed flank. 
In 1947, these strategic perceptions, coupled with the emerg- 
ing technology of the intercontinental manned bomber, were 
being considered throughout the defence communities of both 
nations. The initial notions were  to  post lines of aerial defence as 
far north as possible. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune 
written in early 1947 discussed the intention of the  United States 
to construct a radar picket line and “interceptor rocket and 
fighter bases roughly along the arctic coast of Canada” (Chicago 
Tribune, 1947). 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King denied this  and  took  pains to
emphasize to the Canadian public that the government  was  not 
considering major defence works in the Arctic, nor was the 
United States pressing for access to such facilities. Ultimately, 
the  Americans  were able to make the necessary arrangements 
with  Denmark to build the great airbase at Thule, Greenland, in 
1954. This site, coupled with the interceptor forces stationed in 
Alaska, satisfied American requirements. Had the Danes not 
been accommodating, however, the issue of a major American 
facility in the eastern Canadian Arctic would  almost certainly 
have arisen (Sutherland, 1966). 
The upshot of these preliminary discussions led by the late 
1950s to the construction of the Distant Early  Warning  (DEW) 
radar line, running roughly along the top of the continental land 
mass. The DEW Line project is interesting in  that  it  has  woven 
through it the three themes of defence, sovereignty and  national 
development. 
Rather  than  push the first line of defence into the Far North, 
defence planners elected to  use the North  to  provide strategic 
depth. Radar chains were used to provide early  warning  and to 
identify attack lines. Active defence facilities - interceptors 
and anti-aircraft missiles - were deployed in the South  well 
within the grid of social infrastructure. 
The implications of the DEW Line project to Canadian 
sovereignty were significant. The project was paid for and 
operated by the United States. The DEW Line agreement 
between the two countries contains several clauses relating to 
the protection of the ecology and the culture of the North. Many 
thoughtful Canadians, however, felt that Canada had ceded de 
facto control of the Arctic to the  United States. 
Writing in Maclean’s magazine in 1956, Ralph  Allen  saw a 
“U.S. military base 2,500 miles long within Canada’s geo- 
graphical limits” (Allen, 1956:72). This issue remained politi- 
cally sensitive for the remainder of the decade, leading Canada 
to take over operational control of the DEW  Line  in early 1959. 
The stationing of a handful of Royal Canadian Air Force 
personnel at the four DEW  Line  main sites was essentially a 
symbolic gestures by the Canadian Government to reduce inter- 
nal political pressure. The system continued to be operated and 
paid for by the United States. Canada historically had been 
given to symbolic gestures in the North; assuming operational 
control of the DEW Line was  within the pattern  that exists to this 
day. 
Within the domain of national development, Canada fell heir 
to the by-products of the DEW Line construction. Airfields 
were built, beach  landing sites were developed, charts and  maps 
were improved, aids to navigation were installed. These devel- 
opments significantly improved access to what had hitherto 
been a virtually inaccessible area. There was some initial 
anticipation that a flood of mineral exploration would  follow  in 
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their  wake.  This  notion  proved to be  as  chimerical s Frobisher’s 
search  for gold. 
For  25  years  the  DEW  Line  kept  its long, lonely  polar  watch 
in the  age  of  the ICBM and its seaborne equivalent, the  SLBM. 
The  Soviet  strategic  bomber  fleet  never  developed  into  a  signifi- 
cant force when compared to the other weapons systems. 
Technological  improvements  permitted  the  closing of the  inter- 
mediate stations. While dismantling the system was contem- 
plated  on  several occasions, its  very existence served  to  prevent 
what came to be known as the “Soviet Free Ride” strategic 
option. 
For  the  first four decades of its existence, the  Royal  Canadian 
Navy  studiously  ignored the seas  that  surround  Canada’s  North. 
Until the end of World War 11, no Canadian government or 
admiral ever found  reason to dispatch  any  element of the  fleet to 
far northern waters. In 1945, however, the Royal Canadian 
Navy  was  swept  up  in  the “polar  passion” that  was to grip the 
Canadian  and  U. S .  governments  and defence establishments  for 
about  a decade. 
While Canada, typically, studied  its  options  and needs, the 
U.S. Navy  and  Coast  Guard  sailed  into  the  arctic season a  series 
of exercises designed to increase  military  knowledge  and  oper- 
ating  capabilities  in  the  region.  It  was  not  until  1948  that  the 
RCN  was  ordered  into  northern waters. In the  summer of that 
year, the aircraft carrier Magnificent, with two destroyers in 
company, ventured  into  Hudson Strait. The  destroyers  contin- 
ued  on  into  the  bay itself, calling at Churchill. 
Much  was  made  in  the  Canadian  press  of  this cruise and  a 
similar  voyage  made the following  year  by the frigate HMCS 
Swansea. In reality, the  accomplishment  was  minimal.  None of
the  vessels  in  question  was  ice capable; they  sailed  at he height 
of the ice-free shipping season on sea lanes that had been 
established by the  Hudson  Bay  Company for centuries. Com- 
pared to the  rigours  of  winter  patrols  in  the  Northern Atlantic, 
these  voyages  were  pleasure cruises. 
In  a  1948 speech, the  then minister of national  defence  had 
announced Canada’s intention to build  an  arctic  patrol  vessel for 
the RCN. Six years later, the Navy commissioned HMCS 
Labrador, a 6790-ton icebreaker modelled on the American 
Wind class icebreakers. 
During its brief  naval career, Labrador ranged far and  wide 
throughout  the Arctic, becoming  the first warship ever to transit 
the  Northwest Passage. Labrador was an anomaly  in the anti- 
submarine navy. In essence, she was yet another symbolic 
gesture of sovereignty through presence. In the unpublished 
history of the ship it is written: 
[1954] marked  the  first  incursion of a Canadian naval vessel 
into  waters  which  the U. S . Navy  and  Coast Guard might well be 
excused for considering mare nostrum. For a good  many 
years . . . the only ships seen in the waters of the Canadian 
Archipelago,  apart from a few government  supply  ships,  were 
those flying the Stars and Stripes. In 1954 for the first time 
Canada  had a ship  patrolling  her  northern  waters.  [Department 
of  National  Defence, 1960:  1 .] 
While  Canada  may  have  had  a ship patrolling its northern 
waters, there  was no particular imperative  that the ship wear 
naval  colours .The RCN  had no operational interest in  the  North 
and  cheerfully  transferred  the ship to the Canadian  Coast  Guard 
in 1957. Again, the Navy vanished from the North, not to 
reappear in any major way until the Trudeau government 
ordered it back  in 1970. 
The development of nuclear submarines in the mid-1950s 
~~ ~ 
295 
produced the quintessential arctic vessel. Rather than going 
through  the  ice - as man  had  been trying to do  for centuries - 
the  ultimate  solution  was  now  at  hand: go under it. Through  the 
1960s  the  nuclear  navies  of  the  United States, the Soviet Union 
and, to a lesser extent, Britain challenged the Arctic Ocean 
(Anderson, 1959;Calvert, 1961; Steele, 1962).  Canadaremained 
a  mute spectator throughout the period. 
Canadian soldiers also came into the  North  in  unprecedented 
numbers in the immediate postwar years. There were two 
thrusts to their presence: national development roles, which 
brought  roops  and their families  into  the  territories  on  a 
residential basis; and defence-related exercises, with combat 
soldiers  deployed  north on training exercises. 
The Royal  Canadian  Corps of Signals’ role  with  the  North- 
west Territories and  Yukon  Radio System continued as it had  in 
the past, expanding and contracting in conjunction with the 
modest  industrial  developments  in  the  Northwest.  In  the  Yukon 
the  Canadian  Army  took over the responsibility for the  mainte- 
nance of the Canadian portion of the Alaska Highway. 
Whitehorse, also the site of  a  military  communications  research 
facility  and  an airbase, developed into a  substantial “garrison 
town” - a first for the North. 
The  other side of the coin, defence of the North, presented 
some interesting complexities to Canada. As the Cold War 
developed, soldiers also looked at the  North as an approach. 
There were  a  few  extremists  who  posited  the  notion  of  “Slavic 
hordes” invading North America via the Yukon-Mackenzie 
Valley route; their voices soon vanished once the  geographic 
realities of the concept  were examined. What  came to be  known 
as  the “lodgement  scenario,”  however, refused to go away. 
Americq-sponsored activities during the war  and after had 
led to the series of airfields being  built  throughout  the  North. 
Field  Marshall Alexander, the  governor general, had  observed 
to  Mackenzie  King  that  the sites had  the  potential to become 
“bases  from which the enemy  himself  may operate, but  would 
not  operate  were  they  not there” (Pickersgill, 1970:370).  Lester 
Pearson  held similar views.  While  he  accepted  the  view  that 
eventually commercial and military needs would dictate the 
requirement for the construction of northern  airfields  and  hence 
a  capability to defend them, he  favoured delaying such  develop- 
ment as long as possible - the “scorched ice” theory of 
defence. 
Given the plethora of bases  that  had  already  been  developed 
and the immensity of the area, the cost in both dollars and 
manpower to emplace fixed defences  at all of  these facilities 
would  have been staggering. Canada  elected to develop forces 
with  the capability of  recapturing  a  Soviet-occupied  airfield  in 
the North.  This approach  was  in sharp contrast to the American 
deployment  of  almost  a division’s worth  of  combat  troops  in 
Alaska. 
While most of the northern airfields were not sufficiently 
large to accept  heavy bombers, a  few of them  were.  In  particu- 
lar, Whitehorse, Churchill, Frobisher  Bay  and  Goose  Bay  were 
potential targets. It must be remembered  that  in  the late 1940s 
and early 1950s aviation technology, despite the tremendous 
strides  during wartime, still had  some  very  important  limita- 
tions. There were no truly  intercontinental bombers, and  mid- 
air refuelling techniques were still to be perfected. Intercon- 
tinental  missiles  were  a  technological  generation  in the future. 
The popular  war scenario as it related to the  Canadian  North 
was  that Soviet bombers  would strike over the  Pole at the  heart 
of the  United States. In the wake of these bombers  would  come 
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airborne troops, who would seize a number of bases in the 
Canadian  North  where the bombers could land, refuel and  return 
to the  main Soviet bases to rearm. 
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, Canadian troops, 
sometimes alone and sometimes in conjunction with their Ameri- 
can counterparts, trained in the North. Mobility  remained the 
principal problem to be overcome. In order to capture an 
objective, adequate combat power had to be concentrated in 
time  and space. The isolation factor - the absence of a  road  grid 
- dominated training exercises, the vast majority of which 
were carried out  in winter when  movement in the North is at  its 
easiest. Then, as now, there was an unfortunate tendency to 
equate northern operations to winter operations, a serious logi- 
cal fallacy. However, significant experience base  was  created  in 
the 1950s. In addition, a Supplementary Reserve group styled 
the Canadian Rangers was raised in communities throughout the 
North to provide  a cadre of potential guides and observers to 
support  military activities. 
Military interest in the North  peaked  in the late 1950s and 
diminished rapidly thereafter, as the world entered the missile 
era. The Navy gradually stopped its  northern  summer cruises. 
Army exercises ceased. The radio system and  the Alaska 
Highway  were  turned over to civil departments of government. 
The Canadian Rangers were left to wither on the vine. Aerial 
surveillance flights were curtailed. In the later part of the 
Diefenbaker years, Canadian defence policy  was  dominated by 
the three “Ns” of NORAD, NATO and nuclear weapons. 
Lester Pearson’s Liberal administration during the following 
five years completed the process of withdrawal. By 1965, only 
the  DEW Line stations remained (I have arbitrarily excluded 
discussion of the northern military communications research 
facilities from this study). The 1964 White Paper on Defence 
does not contain a single reference to the Canadian North. 
THE SECOND SURGE 
Sovereignty and Symbolism, 1970-80 
The 1968 federal election returned the Liberals, now  led  by 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, to power  with  a substantial majority. The 
Canada Trudeau was to lead was a nation with a buoyant 
economy  and  an enthusiastic sense of nationalism flowing from 
the centennial celebrations of the previous year. Trudeau  him- 
self  had  a strong sense of national priorities and  led  a generally 
supportive country into new areas of concern and in new 
directions. Nowhere was this more true than in the Canadian 
North. 
Trudeau was keenly interested in northern development. 
Canada’s  North: 1970-1980, produced by the Department of 
Indian Affairs and  Northern Development (DIAND) (1969) was 
issued as the cornerstone of the government’s integrated north- 
ern policy. The document posited four northern goals: the 
provision of a higher standard of living for northern residents, 
the maintenance and enhancement of the northern environment, 
the encouragement of economic development and the mainte- 
nance of Canadian sovereignty and security in the North. No 
thoughtful Canadian was likely to argue with these goals as 
stated. They were generally well received, but Canadians as a 
whole  reserved final judgement until the government revealed 
specific programs to meet these goals. For the Department of 
National Defence, the last goal - maintenance of sovereignty 
and  security-  had strong overtones of possible military  involve- 
ment.  Even the first three goals could  have  been extended to 
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encompass military effort were the government to decide to 
revive  the dormant nation-building role of the Canadian forces. 
At the same time as the government was developing its 
northern policy, a major review of defence policy  was initiated. 
Although  a white paper on the subject was  not  issued  until the 
summer of 197 1 ,  the prime minister had  indicated  as early as 
April 1969 that he intended major revisions in defence policy. 
He ranked Canadian defence priorities as the protection of 
sovereignty, the defence of North America, fulfilment of  NATO 
commitments and international peacekeeping roles. In  a sense, 
this  did  not represent a major departure from the previous (1964) 
white paper. However, it was clear that it was Trudeau’s 
intention to change the emphasis. During the Pearson years, 
NATO  and  UN peacekeeping had  received the lion’s share of 
Canadian defence attention and resource allocation despite their 
second  and  third  places in the ranking of priorities. The direct 
protection  of Canada consisted of forces assigned to NORAD. 
The threat of invasion, however small, distant or short lived, 
was assessed as being so low  as to warrant  being ignored. 
The notion of protection of sovereignty as a  military role was 
the  key  to the Trudeau thesis. The prime minister  indicated  that 
it was  his intention to reduce substantially the Canadian contri- 
bution  to  Western European defence in  NATO.  What  was  not 
immediately apparent was  whether or not there was  a direct link 
between the need to protect sovereignty and  the  NATO force 
reduction. Equally unclear were the specific nature of the role to 
be  played  by the Canadian Forces in protecting sovereignty and 
the extent to which the government was  prepared to commit men 
and  money to meet sovereign challenges. The underlying ques- 
tion, which  was frequently raised in the House of Commons and 
in public discussion during 1968 and 1969, was just what 
specifically was Canada sovereign of in the North, who was 
challenging this sovereignty and  in  what ways. 
Much of the public concern, which  bordered on near hysteria 
in some cases, over northern sovereignty between 1969 and 
197 1 focused on the two voyages of the American supertanker 
Manhattan into the Arctic to study the feasibility of transporting 
crude oil from the Alaskan  North Slope in icebreaking tankers 
operating year round  through the Northwest Passage. Canada 
supported both voyages by providing Coast Guard icebreakers 
as escorts for the Manhattan but  was clearly unhappy over the 
prospect of actual oil-transporting activities being developed 
without a Canadian input of pollution controls and safety 
standards. The issue centered around the status of the Northwest 
Passage. Canada thought of the passage as internal waters. The 
American  view  was that the passage was  an international strait. 
Agreement  between theNorth American  allies  was neverreached, 
and to a large extent the matter remains in limbo. The imperative 
for resolution diminished considerably when  Humble Oil aban- 
doned the tanker project and decided, for a  number  of reasons, 
to build a trans-Alaskan pipeline to move the oil to market. 
Maxwell  Cohen  has  produced  probably the best short analysis 
on  the impact of the “Manhattan incident” on Canadian public 
opinion. He wrote: 
Manhattan’s two  voyages  made  Canadians  feel that they  were on 
the  edge of another  American “steal” of Canadian  resources 
and “rights” which had to be dealt with at once by firm 
governmental  action. In a sense . . . the kind of “panic”  atmos- 
phere in Canada in 1969 and 1970 on the  Arctic  question  was 
unfortunate. To a large  extent, it was  part of the  near  paranoia 
that  was  infecting  much of the  Canadian  view  of  its  continental 
prospects in Canadian-American  relations.  [Cohen, 1971:72.] 
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By 1970  Canadian  northern  perspectives  were  terribly  con- 
fused. The government’s  position  was  that  there  was  no  chal- 
lenge to Canadian sovereignty over northern lands, either 
continental or archipelagic. Similarly, territorial  waters  and  the 
arctic  seabed  were  seen as being  firmly  within  Canada’s  sover- 
eignty. Certainly  no  nation  had  challenged  that  position in at 
least two generations. The only possible area where Canada 
could  be  challenged  was  in the matter of the commercial  and 
peaceful use of the Northwest Passage. At the same time, 
Canada’s  Armed Forces had  been  given  the  primary  mission of 
protecting sovereignty, with  particular  emphasis  on  the North. 
Yet, by the government’s own admission, the only possible 
challenge  to  Canadian claims - and  that  in  a  very  specific  and 
restricted  area - was  mounted  not by  an  international  rival or 
threat, but  by  the  United States, Canada’s closest  ally  and  major 
trading partner. Given  this  perplexing  set of circumstances, it is 
little  wonder  that  the  Canadian  public  at large and  the  Canadian 
Forces  in  particular  had  some considerable difficulty  in  coming 
to  grips  with  the  role of the  military  in the ‘‘new North. ” 
The  197  1  White  Paper  on Defence, Defence in rhe 70s, stated 
that “defence policy must,  however, also  take  into  account  the 
possibility that other challenges to Canada’s sovereignty and 
independence, mainly  non-military in character [emphasis 
added], may  be  more likely to arise during  the 1970s” 
(Department of National Defence, 1971:8). The crux of the 
matter lies in  the  appropriateness of a  military  response to a 
non-military challenge. Implicit  in  the  logic  of Defence in the 
70s is  the  signalling  of  the  intention to use  military  forces in an 
operational role below the threshold of violence, while still 
retaining  the  option to use force in  extreme situations. 
Although  the  white paper provided  few details, it  stated  that 
the main task for the forces in the protection of sovereignty 
would be surveillance. It was admitted, however, that such 
surveillance  would  of  necessity  be  extremely limited. Opera- 
tions by existing long-range patrol aircraft, configured as they 
were for anti-submarine warfare, were limited by light and 
weather  and  the  absence of suitable northern  airfields.  Surveil- 
lance by  the ships of  Maritime  Command  was  limited o the  few 
ice-free  months  of  the year, and then only in certain waters. 
Ground surveillance by soldiers  was  seen as simply  impractica- 
ble  because of the  huge size of the  area involved. 
The  implication  here  was of great  significance to the  Cana- 
dian Forces. While  Canadian force levels  in  Europe  were  being 
halved, the  withdrawn  troops were,not to be committed to the 
protection  of sovereignty; the forces were  to  be reduced. Simi- 
larly, the  new role, it was implied, would  have to be  fulfilled 
with  equipment  and facilities then  in  the  Forces’ inventory. No 
new “northern-sovereignty” equipment was to be obtained, 
such as special  reconnaissance aircraft or surveillance  equip- 
ment  for existing aircraft for the  Air Force; no  ice-capable or 
under-ice ships for the Navy; no all-terrain vehicles for the 
In  summary of the  sovereign  threats to Canada’s North, the 
Army 
prime  minister said: 
There is not now, nor is it conceivable that there ever  will be 
from any source, challenges to Canadian Sovereignty on the 
mainland,  in  the  islands,  in  the  minerals  lying in the  continental 
shelf  below the  Arctic  waters, or in our territorial seas. [Debates, 
House of Commons, 19702713.1 
In the government’s view, while  protection of sovereignty  was 
the first military priority, the threat to that sovereignty was 
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minimal and, under existing conditions, did  not  warrant  a  major 
commitment of men, resources and  money.  To  protect  sover- 
eignty  in  the North, the  government  adopted  a  policy  strikingly 
analogous to the  situation  that  existed  in  Canada  at  the  time of  the 
1922  Eastern  Arctic Expedition. In the 1920s,  Canada estab- 
lished  sovereignty  in  the  Arctic  with  a  symbolic  presence of  the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In the 1970s, Canada pre- 
pared to protect  that same sovereignty  with  a  symbolic  presence 
of  the  Canadian  Armed Forces. 
In  a simplistic manner, presence  was  equated to protection  of 
sovereignty. To this end, a  number of programs  and  projects 
were initiated, some  of  them  quite  innovative  in  their  approach. 
Land, air and  sea  components of the Armed Forces were all 
involved  in  this  return to the North. With  a  few  notable 
exceptions, however, the  number  of  Canadian  troops  stationed 
permanently  in  the  North  was  not  increased.  The  Department of 
National  Defence  argued  that “i  is felt that our operational  units 
can  most  economically  and  effectively  be  stationed  at  southern 
bases  and  moved to the North  when  required  for  a  particular 
operation” (Department of Indian  Affairs  and  Northern  Devel- 
opment, 1970:94). 
In 1970 Maritime Command sent its ships into northern 
waters for the first time since 1962 “to provide a tangible 
presence  in  the  Canadian North” (Department of Indian  Affairs 
and  Northern  Development , 1970:94).  In  addition to NORPLOY, 
as the naval northern deployments have come to be called, 
Maritime  Command also began to take its first  tentative  steps  in 
regaining expertise in ice-filled waters. Not having an ice- 
breaker of its own, the  Navy  made  arrangements to have  several 
officers, cadets and ratings attached to icebreakers of the 
Canadian  Coast  Guard for “arctic indoctrination.” 
Maritime  Command’s  patrol aircraft were  even  more  involved 
in  northern operations, for theirs was  a  year-round task. On  the 
average, four long-range surveillance patrols  were  undertaken 
each  month  by aircraft flying out  of  bases  in  Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward  Island  and  British Columbia, while  the  smaller  Tracker 
aircraft  accounted for an  additional 300 hours  along  the  coasts of 
northern  Quebec  and  Baffin Island. 
Mobile Command (the “army” of the Canadian Forces) 
initiated  a  continuing series of  arctic  indoctrination  patrols in 
April of the same year. Named Exercise New Viking, the 
project  took  Canadian  combat  soldiers to places  in  the  North 
where  troops  had  never  exercised  before. The headquarters  for 
the project  was  permanently  established  at  Churchill  in fac lities 
loaned  to DND by  the  Department of Public  Works. A small 
staff of instructors handled  a  new  group  of  candidates every two 
weeks  on  a  year-round basis. 
In  addition to the  New  Viking program, Mobile  Command 
repeatedly exercised the newly formed Canadian Airborne 
Regiment  in  parachute  assault exercises in  the  North.  In  quick 
succession the regiment dropped at Coral Harbour, Inuvik, 
Watson Lake and in Alaska in a joint Canadian-American 
exercise. While the New Viking program emphasized arctic 
indoctrination, the  Airborne  Regiment  clearly  was  developing 
and practising combat techniques in the North. Should the 
“unthinkable”  ever happen  and  Canadian  troops  be  obliged  to 
fight to  regain  northern territory, the  isolation  of  the  area  made  it 
inevitable that any operation would have to begin with the 
establishment  of  an  airhead:  hence  the origins and  training of  the 
Airborne Regiment. 
During 1971 and the early winter of 1972 the extent of 
military presence continued to grow, the programs of 1970 
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being  continued  and expanded. Argus  aircraft  flew 43 missions 
during  the  year for a total  of over  2000 flying hours. In  August 
three  ships  from  Maritime  Command  cruised  and  showed  the 
flag  in  Davis  and  Hudson straits. New  Viking  serials  continued; 
at  year’s end,  over 2200  troops  had  received  arctic  indoctrina- 
tion. Mobile  Command exercises saw  the entire Airborne  Regi- 
ment dropping at Resolute Bay in December. A few months 
later, a major  exercise  (by  Canadian  standards)  was  attempted  at 
Frobisher Bay. In all, over 1500  troops  were  deployed  into  the 
Eastern Arctic. In  subsequent years, the  same  pattern  contin- 
ued. The Air  Force  flew its periodic  surveillance  missions  with 
the  ancient  Argus aircraft. An operational  support ship of the 
Navy  cruised  in  northern  waters  during  ice-free months, and  the 
Army continued to exercise sub-units and the Canadian Air- 
borne Regiment in both summer and winter throughout the 
North. 
It is evident that  the  vast  majority of those  military  forces  that 
were providing a presence in the North were transients. The 
operational  units of the sea, land  and air element  that  periodi- 
cally exercised in the North were not exclusively concerned 
with the area. In  point  of fact, all  these  southern-based  units 
were  multitasked  and  the  northern  commitment  formed  only a 
relatively  small part of their operational  role.  In  this respect, 
Canada  maintained its traditional  posture of using  multipurpose 
units based in southern Canada to perform  specific  northern- 
related tasks of relatively short duration. Those few military 
elements stationed permanently in the North were “in the 
North,” not “of the North.” The  Supplementary  Radio  System 
stations at Inuvik and Alert were primarily concerned with 
communications research. The DEW Line main sites were 
primarily  concerned  with continental air defence. 
While  the  Department of National  Defence  continued  in its 
time-honoured  pattern  with  respect to the  employment of opera- 
tional forces in  the North,  a significant departure  from  tradition 
was  signalled  by  the  formation  of a headquarters  specifically 
devoted to the  coordination of military  activities  in  the North. 
By 1975 the Canadian  Forces  had  re-established  themselves 
in the North to an unprecedented degree. While there were 
fewer  troops  permanently  stationed  in  the  region  than  there  had 
been in the late 1950s, Canadian servicemen from all three 
services  were  continually  being  exposed to the  northern  envi- 
ronment.  The stablishment of a Northern  Region  in  the  Forces’ 
organization underlined the fact that, for the first time, the 
Department of National  Defence  was  prepared  to  admit  that  the 
North  had  an intrinsic value to the  country  as a whole  and  that a 
military  presence  was  required  in  the area. The Canadian  Forces 
recognized  and  accepted  the  uniqueness  of the North, which  is 
the first step in understanding the area. Within  the limits 
imposed  by available equipment  and funding, they  learned  how 
to live and to a limited  extent operate  “north of 60” and  found 
the  challenge of doing so an interesting  one. 
The national  interest  in  the  North  did  not  remain  unabated. 
Other issues caught  political  attention - constitutional  reform 
and  economic policies. The symbolic  presence  maintained by 
various  elements of the  Canadian  Forces  had  begun to slacken 
by the  beginning of the 1980s. Faced  with  reduced budgets, an 
aging  inventory of equipment  and a multiplicity of missions, 
Canada’s  military leaders cut where  they could. One of the  areas 
to suffer was  the North.  The  North, the  land  of  tomorrow,  could 
wait. 
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THE  THIRD  SURGE 
The  Land of Tomorrow, 1987 and  Beyond 
Challenge  and  Commitment, the 1987  White Paper on 
Defence, when viewed from a “northern” perspective is a 
striking  document: it contains  not one but  three  polar  projection 
maps  to illustrate various  defence-related  realities  and  percep- 
tions. Clearly, the  Canadian  North  is  about to receive  another 
pulse. 
Defence  and  protection of sovereignty  remain  the  predomi- 
nant themes. The  northern  approach  will  remain guarded. The 
updating of the DEW Line, now styled the North Warning 
System, is most easily understood in terms of the Reagan 
administration’s  concern  with defence matters  and  the  advent of 
aircraft-launched cruise missile technology.  Again, the  strate- 
gic defence of  North  America cannot be  divided  into  specific 
threats to the  northern nations. 
The decision to build forward-operating bases for CF18 
interceptor aircraft at five locations north of 60 at  first  glance 
appears  related  more to the now  traditional  sovereignty-presence 
concept  than  to defence needs. The  sheer size of the area, the 
relative  paucity of actual aircraft, the  tremendous  support  infra- 
structure  modern  fighters  require  and  the  vulnerability of the 
sites to a “corridor clearing” pre-emptive strike lead one to 
question the tactical validity of the program. Symbolically, 
however, it is  important for a nation to be able to project  its  air 
power over its entire territory. 
The most controversial aspect of the white paper is the 
decision to acquire a fleet of nuclear submarines in order to 
permit Canada to project sea power on three oceans. The 
repeated  emphasis  on  three  oceans  has  led  many  casual  observ- 
ers to  assume  that  the  main  reason for acquiring the nuclear  fleet 
is to patrol  the  Arctic Ocean. It is  most  unlikely  that  this  will  be 
the  main  operating area of the vessels. Having them, however, 
provides  Canada  with a significant  range of options  not  pre- 
viously available. 
The  white  paper also acknowledges  the  requirement  for  land 
forces to be able to operate in the North. The notion of the 
coupling  of  the  Airborne  Regiment to provide access  and  new 
air portable reserve brigades to provide response is partially 
developed.  What  remains to be seen is if the  government  has  the 
resolution to acquire  the  technology  and  techniques to support 
tactical movement within the North as opposed to strategic 
movement into the North.  The lodgement scenario still remains, 
now  cloaked  in  the  mantle  of a diversion. Given  the  Canadian 
commitment to deploy the majority  of  its  land  forces  to  Europe 
in time of crisis, it is important that the country have the 
capability to handle  hostile  incursions  within  its  own  territory  at 
the  same time. 
The white  paper  also  expresses  the  intent to strengthen  the 
Canadian  Rangers  and to build a northern  training center. These 
same  projects  were  mooted  in the 1971  white paper. Old 
northern  hands  must  be  permitted to be  skeptical  and  adopt  an 
“I’ll believe it when I see it” attitude. 
The protection of sovereignty role as discussed within the 
white  paper  clearly  has a focus  on  the North. Within  the  section 
on sovereignty, the  concept of ‘ ‘the  military  role  in  sovereignty 
is that of the ultimate coercive force available. . . ” (Depart- 
ment of National Defence, 1987:24). The analysis then goes 
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on  to  note  that  monitoring or surveillance in  itself is inadequate 
and that “to exercise effective control, there must also be a 
capability to respond with force against incursions.” Here 
abstract concepts come up against hard political and economic 
realities. Sovereignty violations within the context of the  white 
paper are only likely to be mounted by public (or private) 
elements of the United States. One must seriously question 
whether or not in these circumstances the threat of military force 
has any credibility whatsoever - in  the air, on the land, on the 
seas or under the seas. Many  would say it does not. Perhaps the 
ultimate symbol and tool of Canadian sovereignty in the North 
remains the same as it has throughout this century: a constable 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police armed with nothing 
more  than  an arrest warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Isolation perhaps  best explains why  there  has  in reality been 
such little change in the overall pattern of military activity in 
the  North during the period covered in this article. The sheer 
size of the area coupled with  the absence of a roadhail grid  and 
the  ice-covered  seas creates isolation. Isolation compounds  the 
difficulties attendant upon  any  military activity. 
The complex intertwining of Canadian and  American inter- 
ests in the North has been frequently mentioned here. It is 
important, however, to distinguish between the fundamental 
differences of perception of the two North  American allies. The 
United States has traditionally, now and in the foreseeable 
future  thought of “north” as a direction of strategic approach. 
Canada, on the other hand, has historically viewed the North as 
a place that, however remote and unknown, is still an  inherent 
part of the nation. 
Canada  has  in the past accommodated the strategic northern 
perceptions of the United States and  has  permitted access and 
development as  well a providing a modicum of financial and/or 
physical support. Only a major change in defence policy is 
likely to interrupt that pattern, although concepts currently 
being espoused by the New Democratic Party would appear to 
advocate just such a change. 
Canadian military concern with the North remains firmly 
anchored in the concept of protection of sovereignty - usually 
translated as presence. That this presence is often created to 
offset some  American enterprise is almost fundamental to the 
Canadian  way of thinking. Throughout the century Canadian 
statesmen, politicians and soldiers, to the degree that  they  were 
concerned  with  military activity in the North, were  focused on 
the implicit threat to sovereignty by the American presence. The 
North is likely to remain an uneasy aspect of the defence 
alliance. 
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Activities in the North undertaken by the military for the 
specific purpose of national development are probably things of 
the past. The civilian infrastructure now exists to build and 
operate the type of facilities originally pioneered by the mili- 
tary. National development “spinoffs” from defence-related 
activities will continue to occur. To the degree that develop- 
ment, as equated to the “southern” way of life, is seen as a 
positive force, the North will continue to benefit from these 
enterprises. The negative aspect of these spinoffs is  the counter- 
productive impacts they  may have on traditional lifestyles and 
the ecology of the area. 
As the Canadian military gears for yet another spate of 
activity in the North -the third  in the 40 years covered by this 
paper - one fact remains, the image created by Captain W.F. 
Butler over a century ago when travelling in  what  was  then “the 
North” stiIl holds true: the North remains “the great lone 
land.” 
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